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Abstract—The growing popularity of cloud-based machine
learning raises a natural question about the privacy guarantees
that can be provided in such a setting. Our work tackles this
problem in the context where a client wishes to classify private
images using a convolutional neural network (CNN) trained by
a server. Our goal is to build efficient protocols whereby the
client can acquire the classification result without revealing their
input to the server, while guaranteeing the privacy of the server’s
neural network.
To this end, we design GAZELLE, a scalable and low-latency sys-
tem for secure neural network inference, using an intricate com-
bination of homomorphic encryption and traditional two-party
computation techniques (such as garbled circuits). GAZELLE
makes three contributions. First, we design the GAZELLE homo-
morphic encryption library which provides fast algorithms for
basic homomorphic operations such as SIMD (single instruction
multiple data) addition, SIMD multiplication and ciphertext
permutation. Second, we implement the GAZELLE homomorphic
linear algebra kernels which map neural network layers to
optimized homomorphic matrix-vector multiplication and convo-
lution routines. Third, we design optimized encryption switching
protocols which seamlessly convert between homomorphic and
garbled circuit encodings to enable implementation of complete
neural network inference.
We evaluate our protocols on benchmark neural networks
trained on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets and show that
GAZELLE outperforms the best existing systems such as MiniONN
(ACM CCS 2017) by 20× and Chameleon (Crypto Eprint
2017/1164) by 30× in online runtime. Similarly when compared
with fully homomorphic approaches like CryptoNets (ICML
2016) we demonstrate three orders of magnitude faster online
run-time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fueled by the massive influx of data, sophisticated algo-
rithms and extensive computational resources, modern ma-
chine learning has found surprising applications in such di-
verse domains as medical diagnosis [12], [39], facial recogni-
tion [35] and credit risk assessment [2]. We consider the setting
of supervised machine learning which proceeds in two phases:
a training phase where a labeled dataset is turned into a model,
and an inference or classification phase where the model is
used to predict the label of a new unlabelled data point.
Our work tackles a class of complex and powerful machine
learning models, namely convolutional neural networks (CNN)
which have demonstrated better-than-human accuracy across
a variety of image classification tasks [25].
One important use-case for such CNNs is for medical
diagnosis. A large hospital with a wealth of data on, say, retinal
images of patients can use techniques from recent works,
e.g., [39], to train a convolutional neural network that takes a
retinal image as input and predicts the occurrence of a medical
condition called diabetic retinopathy. The hospital may now
wish to make the model available for use by the whole world
and additionally, to monetize the model.
The first solution that comes to mind is for the hospital
to make the model available for public consumption. This is
undesirable for at least two reasons: first, once the model is
given away, there is clearly no opportunity for the hospital to
monetize it; and secondly, the model, which has been trained
on private patient data, and may reveal information about
particular patients, violating their privacy and perhaps even
regulations such as HIPAA.
A second solution that comes to mind is for the hospital to
adopt the “machine learning as a service” paradigm and build
a web service that hosts the model and provides predictions
for a small fee. However, this is also undesirable for at least
two reasons: first, the users of such a service will rightfully be
concerned about the privacy of the inputs they are providing
to the web service; and secondly, the hospital may not even
want to know the user inputs for reasons of legal liability in
case of a data breach.
The goal of our work is to resolve this conundrum of secure
neural network inference. More concretely we aim to provide
a way for the hospital and the user to interact in such a way
that the user eventually obtains the prediction (without learning
the model) and the hospital obtains no information about the
user’s input.
Modern cryptography provides us with many tools, in
particular fully homomorphic encryption and garbled circuits,
that can help us address this issue. The first key take-away
from our work is that both techniques have their limitations;
understanding their precise trade-offs and using a combination
of them judiciously in an application-specific manner helps
us overcome the individual limitations and achieve substantial
gains in performance. Thus let us begin by discussing these
two techniques and their relative merits and shortcomings.
Homomorphic Encryption: Fully Homomorphic Encryp-
tion, or FHE, is an encryption method that allows anyone
to compute an arbitrary function f on an encryption of x,
without decrypting it and without knowledge of the private
key [5], [14], [31]. As a result, one obtains an encryption of
f(x). Weaker versions of FHE, collectively called partially
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homomorphic encryption or PHE, permit the computation of
a subset of all functions, typically functions that perform only
additions or functions that can be computed by depth-bounded
arithmetic circuits. An example of an additively homomor-
phic encryption (AHE) scheme is the Paillier scheme [28].
Examples of depth-bounded homomorphic encryption scheme
(called leveled homomorphic encryption or LHE) are the
family of lattice-based schemes such as the Brakerski-Gentry-
Vaikuntanathan [4] scheme and its derivatives [6], [13]. Recent
efforts, both in theory and in practice have given us large gains
in the performance of several types of PHE schemes and even
FHE schemes [4], [7], [8], [15], [19], [32].
The major bottleneck for these techniques, notwithstanding
these recent developments, is their computational complexity.
The computational cost of LHE, for example, grows dramat-
ically with the number of levels of multiplication that the
scheme needs to support. Indeed, the recent CryptoNets system
gives us a protocol for secure neural network inference using
LHE [16]. Largely due to its use of LHE, CryptoNets has
two shortcomings. First, they need to change the structure of
neural networks and retrain them with special LHE-friendly
non-linear activation functions such as the square function
(as opposed to commonly used functions such as ReLU
and Sigmoid) to suit the computational needs of LHE. This
has a potentially negative effect on the accuracy of these
models. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, even with
these changes, the computational cost is prohibitively large.
For example, on a neural network trained on the MNIST
dataset, the end-to-end latency of CryptoNets is 297.5 seconds,
in stark contrast to the 30 milliseconds end-to-end latency
of GAZELLE. In spite of the use of interaction, our online
bandwidth per inference for this network is a mere 0.05MB
as opposed to the 372MB required by CryptoNets.
In contrast to the LHE scheme in CryptoNets, GAZELLE
employs, a much simpler packed additively homomorphic
encryption (PAHE) scheme, which we show can support very
fast matrix-vector multiplications and convolutions. Lattice-
based AHE schemes come with powerful features such as
SIMD evaluation and automorphisms (described in detail in
Section III) which make them the ideal tools for common
linear-algebraic computations. The second key take-away from
our work is that even in applications where only additive
homomorphisms are required, lattice-based AHE schemes far
outperform other AHE schemes such as the Paillier scheme
both in computational and communication complexity.
Two Party Computation: Yao’s garbled circuits [40] and
the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson (GMW) protocol [17] are two
leading methods for the task of two-party secure computation
(2PC). After three decades of theoretical and applied work
improving and optimizing these protocols, we now have
very efficient implementations, e.g., see [9]–[11], [30]. The
modern versions of these techniques have the advantage of
being computationally inexpensive, partly because they rely on
symmetric-key cryptographic primitives such as AES and SHA
and use them in a clever way [3], because of hardware support
in the form of the Intel AES-NI instruction set, and because of
techniques such as oblivious transfer extension [3], [24] which
limit the use of public-key cryptography to an offline reusable
pre-processing phase.
The major bottleneck for these techniques is their com-
munication complexity. Indeed, three recent works followed
this paradigm and designed systems for secure neural net-
work inference: the SecureML system [27], the MiniONN
system [26], the DeepSecure system [33]. All three rely on
Yao’s garbled circuits.
DeepSecure uses garbled circuits alone; SecureML uses
Paillier’s AHE scheme to speed up some operations; and
MiniONN uses a weak form of lattice-based AHE to generate
so-called “multiplication triples” for the GMW protocol, fol-
lowing the SPDZ framework [9]. Our key claim is that under-
standing the precise trade-off point between AHE and garbled
circuit-type techniques allows us to make optimal use of both
and achieve large net computational and communication gains.
In particular, in GAZELLE, we use optimized AHE schemes in
a completely different way from MiniONN: while they employ
AHE as a pre-processing tool for the GMW protocol, we use
AHE to dramatically speed up linear algebra directly.
For example, on a neural network trained on the CIFAR-
10 dataset, the most efficient of these three protocols, namely
MiniONN, has an online bandwidth cost of 6.2GB whereas
GAZELLEhas an online bandwidth cost of 0.3GB. In fact, we
observe across the board a reduction of 20-80× in the online
bandwidth per inference which gets better as the networks
grow in size. In the LAN setting, this translates to an end-to-
end latency of 3.6s versus the 72s for MiniONN.
Even when comparing to systems such as Chameleon [29]
that rely on trusted third-party dealers, we observe a 30×
reduction in online run-time and 2.5× reduction in online
bandwidth, while simultaneously providing a pure two-party
solution, without relying on third-party dealers. (For more
detailed performance comparisons with all these systems, we
refer the reader to Section VIII).
(F)HE or Garbled Circuits? The Million-dollar Question:
To use (F)HE and garbled circuits optimally, we need to un-
derstand the precise computational and communication trade-
offs between them. Additionally, we need to (a) identify
applications and the right algorithms for these applications;
(b) partition these algorithms into computational sub-routines
where each of these techniques outperforms the other; and (c)
piece together the right solutions for each of the sub-routines
in a seamless way to get a secure computation protocol for
the entire application. Let us start by recapping the trade-offs
between (F)HE and garbled circuits.
Roughly speaking, homomorphic encryption performs better
than garbled circuits when (a) the computation has small multi-
plicative depth, ideally multiplicative depth 0 meaning that we
are computing a linear function; and (b) the Boolean circuit
that performs the computation has large size, say quadratic
in the input size. Matrix-vector multiplication (namely, the
operation of multiplying a plaintext matrix with an encrypted
vector) provides us with exactly such a scenario. Furthermore,
the most time-consuming computations in a convolutional
neural network are indeed the convolutional layers (which are
nothing but a special type of matrix-vector multiplication).
The non-linear computations in a CNN such as the ReLU
or maxpool functions can be written as simple linear-size
circuits which are best computed using garbled circuits. This
analysis is the guiding philosophy that enables the design
of GAZELLE(For detailed descriptions of convolutional neural
networks, we refer the reader to Section II).
Our System: The main contribution of this work is
GAZELLE, a framework for secure evaluation of convolutional
neural networks. It consists of three components:
• The first component is the Gazelle Homomorphic Layer
which consists of very fast implementations of three
basic homomorphic operations: SIMD addition, SIMD
scalar multiplication, and automorphisms (For a detailed
description of these operations, see Section III). Our inno-
vations in this part consist of techniques for division-free
arithmetic and techniques for lazy modular reductions.
In fact, our implementation of the first two of these
homomorphic operations incurs only 10-20x slower than
the corresponding operations on plaintext, when counting
the number of clock cycles.
• The second component is the Gazelle Linear Algebra ker-
nels which consists of very fast algorithms for homomor-
phic matrix-vector multiplications and homomorphic con-
volutions, accompanied by matching implementations.
In terms of the basic homomorphic operations, SIMD
additions and multiplications turn out to be relatively
cheap whereas automorphisms are very expensive. At a
very high level, our innovations in this part consists of
several new algorithms for homomorphic matrix-vector
multiplication and convolutions that minimize the expen-
sive automorphism operations.
• The third and final component is Gazelle Network In-
ference which uses a judicious combination of garbled
circuits together with our linear algebra kernels to con-
struct a protocol for secure neural network inference.
Our innovations in this part are two-fold. First, the net-
work mapping component extracts and pre-processes the
necessary garbled circuits that are required for network
inference. Second, the network evaluation layer consists
of efficient protocols that switch between secret-sharing
and homomorphic representations of the intermediate
results.
Our protocol also hides strictly more information about the
neural network than other recent works such as the MiniONN
protocol. We refer the reader to Section II for more details.
II. SECURE NEURAL NETWORK INFERENCE
The goal of this section is to describe a clean abstraction of
convolutional neural networks (CNN) and set up the secure
neural inference problem that we will tackle in the rest of
the paper. A CNN takes an input and processes it through a
sequence of linear and non-linear layers in order to classify it
into one of the potential classes. An example CNN is shown
is Figure 1.
A. Linear Layers
The linear layers, shown in Figure 1 in red, can be of
two types: convolutional (Conv) layers or fully-connected (FC)
layers.
Conv Layers: We represent the input to a Conv layer by the
tuple (wi, hi, ci) where wi is the image width, hi is the image
height, and ci is the number of input channels. In other words,
the input consists of ci many wi×hi images. The convolutional
layer is then parameterized by co filter banks each consisting
of ci many fw × fh filters. This is represented in short by the
tuple (fw, fh, ci, co). The computation in a Conv layer can
be better understood in term of simpler single-input single-
output (SISO) convolutions. Every pixel in the output of a
SISO convolution is computed by stepping a single fw × fh
filter across the input image as shown in Figure 2. The output
of the full Conv layer can then be parameterized by the tuple
(wo, ho, co) which represents co many wo×ho output images.
Each of these images is associated to a unique filter bank
and is computed by the following two-step process shown in
Figure 2: (i) For each of the ci filters in the associated filter
bank, compute a SISO convolution with the corresponding
channel in the input image, resulting in ci many intermediate
images; and (ii) summing up all these ci intermediate images.
There are two commonly used padding schemes when
performing convolutions. In the “valid” scheme, no input
padding is used, resulting in an output image that is smaller
than the initial input. In particular we have wo = wi− fw + 1
and ho = hi−fh+1. In the “same” scheme, the input is zero
padded such that output image size is the same as the input.
In practice, the Conv layers sometimes also specify an
additional pair of stride parameters (sw, sh) which denotes
the granularity at which the filter is stepped. After accounting
for the strides, the output image size (wo, ho), is given by
(b(wi− fw + 1)/swc, b(hi− fh + 1)/shc) for valid style con-
volutions and (bwi/swc, bhi/shc) for same style convolutions.
FC Layers: The input to a FC layer is a vector vi of length
ni and its output is a vector vo of length no. A fully connected
layer is specified by the tuple (W, b) where W is (no × ni)
weight matrix and b is an no element bias vector. The output
is specified by the following transformation: vo = Wvi + b.
The key observation that we wish to make is that the number
of multiplications in the Conv and FC layers are given by (wo ·
ho ·co ·fw ·fh ·ci) and ni ·no, respectively. This makes both the
Conv and FC layer computations quadratic in the input size.
This fact guides us to use homomorphic encryption rather than
garbled circuit-based techniques to compute the convolution
and fully connected layers, and indeed, this insight is at the
heart of the much of the speedup achieved by GAZELLE.
B. Non-Linear Layers
The non-linear layers, shown in Figure 1 in blue, consist of
an activation function that acts on each element of the input
separately or a pooling function that reduces the output size.
Typical non-linear functions can be one of several types: the
most common in the convolutional setting are max-pooling
functions and ReLU functions.
Fig. 1. A CNN with two Conv layers and one FC layer. ReLU is used as the activation function and a MaxPooling layer is added after the first Conv layer.
Fig. 2. SISO convolutions and multi-channel Conv layers
The key observation that we wish to make in this context
is that all these functions can be implemented by circuits
that have size linear in the input size and thus, evaluating
them using conventional 2PC approaches does not impose any
additional asymptotic communication penalty.
For more details on CNNs, we refer the reader to [37].
C. Secure Inference
In our setting, there are two parties A and B where A holds
a convolutional neural network (CNN) and B holds an input
to the network, typically an image. We make the distinction
between the architecture of the CNN which includes the
number of layers, the size of each layer, and the activation
functions applied in layer, versus the parameters of the CNN
which includes all the numbers that describe the convolution
and the fully connected layers.
We wish to design a protocol that A and B engage in at
the end of which B obtains the classification result, namely
the output of the final layer of the neural network, whereas A
obtains nothing.
The Threat Model: Our threat model is the same as in
the previous works, namely the SecureML, MiniONN and
DeepSecure systems and, as we argue below, leaks even less
information than in these works.
To be more precise, we consider semi-honest corruptions as
in [26], [27], [33]. That is, A and B adhere to the software
that describes the protocol, but attempt to infer information
about the other party’s input (the network parameters or the
image, respectively) from the protocol transcript. We ask for
the cryptographic standard of ideal/real security [17], [18]. A
comment is in order about the security model.
Our protocol does not completely hide the network architec-
ture; however, we argue that it does hide the important aspects
which are likely to be proprietary. First of all, the protocol
hides all the weights including those involved in the convo-
lution and the fully connected layers. Secondly, the protocol
hides the filter and stride size in the convolution layers, as
well as information on which layers are convolutional layers
and which are fully connected. What the protocol does reveal
is the number of layers and the size (the number of hidden
nodes) of each layer. At a computational expense, we are able
to pad each layer and the number of layers and hide their
exact numbers as well. In contrast, other protocols for secure
neural network inference such as the MiniONN protocol [26]
reveal strictly more information, e.g., they reveal the filter size.
As for party B’s security, we hide the entire image, but not
its size, from party A. All these choices are encoded in the
definition of our ideal functionality.
Paper Organization: The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. We first describe our abstraction of a packed addi-
tively homomorphic encryption (PAHE) that we use through
the rest of the paper. We then provide an overview of the entire
GAZELLE protocol in section IV. In the next two sections,
Section V and VI, we elucidate the most important technical
contributions of the paper, namely the Gazelle Linear Algebra
Kernels for fast matrix-vector multiplication and convolution.
We then present detailed benchmarks on the implementation of
the Gazelle Homomorphic Layer and the linear algebra kernels
in Section VII. Finally, we describe the evaluation of neural
networks such as ones trained on the MNIST or CIFAR-10
datasets and compare GAZELLE’s performance to prior work
in Section VIII.
III. PACKED ADDITIVELY HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
In this section, we describe a clean abstraction of packed
additively homomorphic encryption (PAHE) schemes that we
will use through the rest of the paper. As suggested by the
name, the abstraction will support packing multiple plaintexts
into a single ciphertext, performing SIMD homomorphic ad-
ditions (SIMDAdd) and scalar multiplications (SIMDScMult),
and permuting the plaintext slots (Perm). In particular, we
will never need or use homomorphic multiplication of two ci-
phertexts. This abstraction can be instantiated with essentially
all modern lattice-based homomorphic encryption schemes,
e.g., [4], [6], [13], [15].
For the purposes of this paper, a private-key PAHE suffices.
In such an encryption scheme, we have a (randomized) en-
cryption algorithm (PAHE.Enc) that takes a plaintext message
vector u from some message space and encrypts it using a
key sk into a ciphertext denoted as [u], and a (deterministic)
decryption algorithm (PAHE.Dec) that takes the ciphertext
[u] and the key sk and recovers the message u. Finally, we
also have a (randomized) homomorphic evaluation algorithm
(PAHE.Eval) that takes as input one or more ciphertexts that
encrypt messages M0,M1, . . ., and outputs another ciphertext
that encrypts a message M = f(M0,M1, . . .) for some
function f constructed using the SIMDAdd, SIMDScMult and
Perm operations.
We require two security properties from a homomorphic
encryption scheme: (1) IND-CPA Security, which requires that
ciphertexts of any two messages u and u′ are computationally
indistinguishable; and (2) Function Privacy, which requires
that the ciphertext generated by homomorphic evaluation,
together with the private key sk, reveals the underlying mes-
sage, namely the output f(·), but does not reveal any other
information about the function f .
The lattice-based PAHE constructions that we consider
in this paper are parameterized by four constants: (1) the
cyclotomic order m, (2) the ciphertext modulus q, (3) the
plaintext modulus p and (4) the standard deviation σ of a
symmetric discrete Gaussian noise distribution (χ).
The number of slots in a packed PAHE ciphertext is
given by n = φ(m) where φ is the Euler Totient function.
Thus, plaintexts can be viewed as length-n vectors over Zp
and ciphertexts are viewed as length-n vectors over Zq . All
fresh ciphertexts start with an inherent noise η sampled from
the noise distribution χ. As homomorphic computations are
performed η grows continually. Correctness of PAHE.Dec is
predicated on the fact that |η| < q/(2p), thus setting an upper
bound on the complexity of the possible computations.
In order to guarantee security we require a minimum value
of σ (based on q and n), q ≡ 1 mod m and p is co-prime
to q. Additionally, in order to minimize noise growth in the
homomorphic operations we require that the magnitude of r ≡
q mod p be as small as possible. This when combined with
the security constraint results in an optimal value of r = ±1.
In the sequel, we describe in detail the three basic operations
supported by the homomorphic encryption schemes together
with their associated asymptotic cost in terms of (a) the run-
time, and (b) the noise growth. Later, in Section VII, we
will provide concrete micro-benchmarks for each of these
operations implemented in the GAZELLE library.
A. Ciphertext Addition: SIMDAdd
Given ciphertexts [u] and [v], SIMDAdd outputs an encryp-
tion of their componentwise sum, namely [u + v].
The asymptotic run-time for homomorphic addition is n ·
CostAdd(q), where CostAdd(q) is the run-time for adding two
numbers in Zq = {0, 1, . . . , q−1}. The noise growth is at most
ηu+ηv where ηu (resp. ηv) is the amount of noise in [u] (resp.
in [v]).
B. Scalar Multiplication: SIMDScMult
If the plaintext modulus is chosen such that p ≡ 1 mod m,
we can also support a SIMD compenentwise product. Thus
given a ciphertext [u] and a plaintext v, we can output an
encryption [u◦v] (where ◦ denotes component-wise multipli-
cation of vectors).
The asymptotic run-time for homomorphic scalar multipli-
cation is n · CostMult(q), where CostMult(q) is the run-time
for multiplying two numbers in Zq . The noise growth is at
most ηmult · ηu where ηmult ≈ ||v||′∞ ·
√
n is the multiplicative
noise growth of the SIMD scalar multiplication operation.
For a reader familiar with homomorphic encryption
schemes, we note that ||v||′∞ is the largest value in the
coefficient representation of the packed plaintext vector v, and
thus, even a binary plaintext vector can result in ηmult as high
as p · √n. In practice, we alleviate this large multiplicative
noise growth by bit-decomposing the coefficient representation
of v into log(p/2wpt) many wpt-sized chunks vk such that
v =
∑
2wpt·k · vk. We refer to wpt as the plaintext window
size.
We can now represent the product [u ◦ v] as ∑[uk ◦ vk]
where uk = [2wpt·k ·u]. Since ||vk||′∞ ≤ 2wpt the total noise in
the multiplication is bounded by
∑
k 2
wpt ·√n ·ηuk as opposed
to p · √n · ηu. The only caveat is that we need access to low
noise encryptions [uk] as opposed to just [u] as in the direct
approach.
C. Scalar Multiplication: Perm
Given a ciphertext [u] and one of a set of primitive permuta-
tions pi defined by the scheme, the Perm operation outputs a ci-
phertext [upi], where upi is defined as (upi(1), upi(2), . . . , upi(n)),
namely the vector u whose slots are permuted according to the
permutation pi. The set of permutations that can be supported
depends on the structure of the multiplicative group mod m
i.e. (Z/mZ)×. When m is prime, we have n (= m− 1) slots
and the permutation group supports all cyclic rotations of the
slots, i.e. it is isomorphic to Cn (the cyclic group of order n).
When m is a sufficiently large power of two (m = 2k,m ≥ 8),
Fig. 3. Ciphertext Structure and Operations. Here, n is the number of slots,
q is the size of ciphertext space (so a ciphertext required dlog2 qe bits to
represent), p is the size of the plaintext space (so a plaintext can have at most
blog2 pc bits), and η is the amount of noise in the ciphertext.
Fig. 4. A Plaintext Permutation in action. The permutation pi in this example
swaps the first and the second slots, and also the third and fourth slots. The
operation incurs a noise growth from η to η′ ≈ η + ηrot. Here, ηrot ≈
n log q · η0 where η0 is some small “base noise”.
we have n = 2k−1 and the set of permutations is isomorphic
to the set of half-rotations i.e. Cn/2 × C2, as illustrated in
Figure 4.
Permutations are by far the most expensive operations in a
homomorphic encryption scheme. A single permutation costs
as much as performing a number theoretic transform (NTT),
the analog of the discrete Fourier transform, plus the cost of
Θ(log q) inverse number theoretic transforms (NTT−1). Since
NTT and NTT−1 have an asymptotic cost of Θ(n log n), the
cost is therefore Θ(n log n log q). The noise growth is additive,
namely, ηupi = ηu+ηrot where ηrot is the additive noise growth
of a permutation operation.
D. Paillier vs. Lattice-based PAHE
The PAHE scheme used in GAZELLE is dramatically more
efficient than conventional Paillier based AHE. Homomorphic
addition of two Paillier ciphertexts corresponds to a modular
multiplication modulo a large RSA-like modulus ( 2048bits) as
opposed to a simple addition mod q as seen in SIMDAdd.
Similarly multiplication by a plaintext turns into a modular
exponentiation for Paillier. Furthermore the large sizes of the
Paillier ciphertexts makes encryption of single small integers
extremely bandwidth-inefficient. In contrast, the notion of
packing provided by lattice-based schemes provides us with
a SIMD way of packing many integers into one ciphertext,
as well as SIMD evaluation algorithms. We are aware of
one system [34] that tries to use Paillier in a SIMD fashion;
however, this lacks two crucial components of lattice-based
AHE, namely the facility to multiply each slot with a separate
scalar, and the facility to permute the slots. We are also aware
of a method of mitigating the first of these shortcomings [23],
but not the second. Our fast homomorphic implementation of
linear algebra uses both these features of lattice-based AHE,
making Paillier an inherently unsuitable substitute.
E. Parameter Selection for PAHE
Parameter selection for PAHE requires a delicate balance
between the homomorphic evaluation capabilities and the
target security level. We detail our procedure for parameter
selection to meet a target security level of 128 bits. We first
set our plaintext modulus to be 20 bits to represent the fixed
point inputs (the bit-length of each pixel in an image) and
partial sums generated during the neural network evaluation.
Next, we require that the ciphertext modulus be close to, but
less than, 64 bits in order to ensure that each ciphertext slot
fits in a single machine word while maximizing the potential
noise margin available during homomorphic computation.
The Perm operation in particular presents an interesting
tradeoff between the simplicity of possible rotations and the
computational efficiency of the number-theoretic transform
(NTT). A prime m results in a (simpler) cyclic permutation
group but necessitates the use of an expensive Bluestein
transform. Conversely, the use of m = 2k allows for a 8×
more efficient Cooley-Tukey style NTT at the cost of an
awkward permutation group that only allows half-rotations.
In this work, we opt for the latter and adapt our linear algebra
kernels to deal with the structure of the permutation group.
Based on the analysis of [1], we set m = 4096 and σ = 4 to
obtain our desired security level.
Our chosen bit-width for q, namely 60 bits, allows for lazy
reduction, i.e. multiple additions may be performed without
overflowing a machine word before a reduction is necessary.
Additionally, even when q is close to the machine word-size,
we can replace modular reduction with a simple sequence
of addition, subtraction and multiplications. This is done by
choosing q to be a pseudo-Mersenne number.
Next, we detail a technique to generate prime moduli that
satisfy the above correctness and efficiency properties, namely:
1) q ≡ 1 (mod m)
2) p ≡ 1 (mod m)
3) |q mod p| = |r| ≈ 1
4) q is pseudo-Mersenne, i.e. q = 260 − δ, (δ < √q)
Below, we describe a fast method to generate p and q (We
remark that the obvious way to do this requires at least p ≈ 220
primality tests, even to satisfy the first three conditions).
Since we have chosen m to be a power of two, we observe
that δ ≡ −1 (mod m). Moverover r ≡ q (mod p) implies
that δ ≡ (q − r) (mod p). These two CRT expressions for δ
imply that given a prime p and residue r, there exists a unique
minimal value of δ mod (p ·m).
Based on this insight our prime selection procedure can be
broken down into three steps:
1) Sample for p ≡ 1 mod m and sieve the prime candi-
dates.
2) For each candidate p, compute the potential 2|r| candi-
dates for δ (and thus q).
3) If q is prime and δ is sufficiently small accept the pair
(p, q).
TABLE I
PRIME SELECTION FOR PAHE
blog(p)c p q |r|
18 307201 260 − 212 · 63548 + 1 1
22 5324801 260 − 212 · 122130 + 1 1
26 115351553 260 − 212 · 9259 + 1 1
30 1316638721 260 − 212 · 54778 + 1 2
Fig. 5. Our optimized circuit for step (b) namely Yao garbling. The “+” gates
refer to an integer addition circuit and “-” refers to an integer subtraction
circuit. The trapeziods are multiplexers and the “>” refers to the circuit that
outputs 1 if and only if the input is larger than p/2.
Heuristically, this procedure needs log(q)(p ·m)/(2|r|√q)
candidate primes p to sieve out a suitable q. Since p ≈ 220
and q ≈ 264 in our setting, this procedure is very fast. A
list of reduction-friendly primes generated by this approach is
tabulated in Table I. Finally note that when blog(p)c · 3 < 64
we can use Barrett reduction to speed-up reduction modp.
The impact of the selection of reduction-friendly primes on
the performance of the PAHE scheme is described in section
VII.
IV. OUR PROTOCOL AT A HIGH LEVEL
Our protocol for solving the above problem is based on the
alternating use of packed additively homomorphic encryption
(PAHE) and garbled circuits (GC) to evaluate the neural
network under consideration. Thus, the client B first encrypts
their input using the GAZELLE SIMD linear homomorphic en-
cryption scheme and sends it to the server A. The server A first
uses the GAZELLE homomorphic neural network kernel for the
first layer (which is either convolution or fully connected). The
result is a packed ciphertext that contains the input to the first
non-linear (ReLU) layer.
To evaluate the first non-linear layer, we employ a garbled
circuit based evaluation protocol. Our starting point is the
scenario where A holds a ciphertext [x] (where x is a vector)
and B holds the private key. A and B together do the
following:
(a) Translate from Ciphertext to Shares: The first step is
to convert this into the scenario where A and B hold
an additive secret sharing of x. This is accomplished
by the server A adding a random vector r to her
ciphertext homomorphically to obtain an encryption
[x + r] and sends it to the client B. The client B
decrypts it; the server A sets her share sx = r and
B sets his share cx = x+r (mod p). This is clearly
an additive (arithmetic) secret sharing of x.
(b) Yao Garbled Circuit Evaluation: We now wish to
run the Yao garbled circuit protocol for the non-
linear activation functions f (in parallel for each
component of x) to get a secret sharing of the output
y = f(x). This is done using our circuit from
Figure 5, described in more detail below. The output
of the garbled circuit evaluation is a pair of shares
sy (for the server) and cy (for the client) such that
sy + cy = y (mod p).
(c) Translate back from Shares to a Ciphertext: The
client A encrypts her share cy using the homomor-
phic encryption scheme and sends it to B; B in
turn homomorphically adds his share sy to obtain
an encryption of cy + sy = y = f(x).
Once this is done, we are back where we started. The
next linear layer (either fully connected or convolutional) is
evaluated using the GAZELLE homomorphic neural network
kernel, followed by Yao’s garbled circuit protocol for the next
non-linear layer, so we rinse and repeat until we evaluate the
full network. We make the following two observations about
our proposed protocols:
1) By using AHE for the linear layers, we ensure that the
communication complexity of protocol is linear in the
number of layers and the size of inputs for each layer.
2) At the end of the garbled circuit protocol we have
an additive share that can be encrypted afresh. As
such, we can view the re-encryption as an interactive
bootstrapping procedure that clears the noise introduced
by any previous homomorphic operation.
For the second step of the outline above, we employ the
Boolean circuit described in Figure 5. The circuit takes as
input three vectors: sx = r and sy = r′ (chosen at random)
from the server, and cx from the client. The first block of
the circuit computes the arithmetic sum of sx and cx over
the integers and subtracts p from to obtain the result mod p.
(The decision of whether to subtract p or not is made by the
multiplexer). The second block of the circuit computes a ReLU
function. The third block adds the result to sy to obtain the
client’s share of y, namely cy . For more detailed benchmarks
on the ReLU and MaxPool garbled circuit implementations,
we refer the reader to Section VIII.
In our evaluations, we consider ReLU, Max-Pool and the
square activation functions, the first two are by far the most
commonly used ones in convolutional neural network de-
sign [22], [25], [36], [38]. Note that the square activation
function popularized for secure neural network evaluation in
[16] can be efficiently implemented by a simple interactive
protocol that use the PAHE scheme to generate the cross-
terms.
TABLE II
COMPARING MATRIX-VECTOR PRODUCT ALGORITHMS BY OPERATION COUNT, NOISE GROWTH AND NUMBER OF OUTPUT CIPHERTEXTS
Perm (Hoisted)a Perm SIMDScMult SIMDAdd Noise #out ctb
Naı¨ve 0 no · logni no no · logni ηnaive := η0 · ηmult · ni no+ηrot · (ni − 1)
Naı¨ve
0 no · logni + no − 1 2 · no no · logni + no ηnaive · ηmult · no 1(Output packed) +ηrot · (no − 1)
Naı¨ve
0 no·ni
n
· logni no·nin
no·ni
n
· logni η0 · ηmult · ni no·nin(Input packed) +ηrot · (ni − 1)
Diagonal ni − 1 0 ni ni (η0 + ηrot) · ηmult · ni 1
Hybrid no·ni
n
− 1 log nno
no·ni
n
no·ni
n
+ log n
no
(η0 + ηrot) · ηmult · ni 1
+ηrot · ( nino − 1)
a Rotations of the input with a common PermDecomp b Number of output ciphertexts
c All logarithms are to base 2
V. FAST HOMOMORPHIC MATRIX-VECTOR
MULTIPLICATION
We next describe the GAZELLE homomorphic linear algebra
kernels that compute matrix-vector products (for FC layers)
and 2-d convolutions (for Conv layers). In this section, we
focus on matrix-vector product kernels which multiply a
plaintext matrix with an encrypted vector. We start with the
easiest to explain (but the slowest and most communication-
inefficient) methods and move on to describing optimizations
that make matrix-vector multiplication much faster. In partic-
ular, our hybrid method (see Table IV and the description
below) gives us the best performance among all our homo-
morphic matrix-vector multiplication methods. For example,
multiplying a 128 × 1024 matrix with a length-1024 vector
using our hybrid scheme takes about 16ms on a commodity
machine. (For detailed benchmarks, we refer the reader to
Section VII-C). In all the subsequent examples, we will use an
FC layer with ni inputs and no outputs as a running example.
For simplicity of presentation, unless stated otherwise we
assume that n, ni and no are powers of two. Similarly we
assume that no and ni are smaller than n. If not, we can split
the original matrix into n× n sized blocks that are processed
independently.
A. The Naı¨ve Method
In the naı¨ve method, each row of the no × ni plaintext
weight matrix W is encoded into a separate plaintext vectors
(see Figure 6). Each such vector is of length n; where the first
ni entries contain the corresponding row of the matrix and
the other entries are padded with 0. These plaintext vectors
are denoted w0,w1, . . . ,w(no−1). We then use SIMDScMult
to compute the componentwise product of with the encrypted
input vector [v] to get [ui] = [wi ◦v]. In order to compute the
inner-product what we need is actually the sum of the entries
in each of these vectors ui.
This can be achieved by a “rotate-and-sum” algorithm,
where we first rotate the entries of [ui] by ni/2 positions.
The result is a ciphertext whose first ni/2 entries contain
the sum of the first and second halves of ui. One can then
repeat this process for log2 ni iterations, rotating by half the
previous rotation on each iteration, to get a ciphertext whose
first slot contains the first component of Wv. By repeating
this procedure for each of the no rows we get no ciphertexts,
each containing one element of the result.
Based on this description, we can derive the following
performance characteristics for the naı¨ve method:
• The total cost is no SIMD scalar multiplications, no ·
log2 n rotations (automorphisms) and no · log2 n SIMD
additions.
• The noise grows from η to η ·ηmult ·n+ηrot ·(n−1) where
ηmult is the multiplicative noise growth factor for SIMD
multiplication and ηrot is the additive noise growth for
a rotation. This is because the one SIMD multiplication
turns the noise from η 7→ η · ηmult, and the sequence of
rotations and additions grows the noise as follows:
η·ηmult 7→ (η·ηmult)·2+ηrot 7→ (η·ηmult)·4+ηrot ·3 7→ . . .
which gives us the above result.
• Finally, this process produces no many ciphertexts each
one containing just one component of the result.
This last fact turns out to be an unacceptable efficiency
barrier. In particular, the total network bandwidth becomes
quadratic in the input size and thus contradicts the entire
rationale of using PAHE for linear algebra. Ideally, we want
the entire result to come out in packed form in a single
ciphertext (assuming, of course, that no ≤ n).
A final subtle point that needs to noted is that if n is not a
power of two, then we can continue to use the same rotations
as before, but all slots except the first slot leak information
about partial sums. We therefore must add a random number
to these slots to destroy this extraneous information about the
partial sums.
B. Output Packing
The very first thought to mitigate the ciphertext blowup is-
sue we just encountered is to take the many output ciphertexts
and somehow pack the results into one. Indeed, this can be
done by (a) doing a SIMD scalar multiplication which zeroes
out all but the first coordinate of each of the out ciphertexts;
(b) rotating each of them by the appropriate amount so that
Fig. 6. The naı¨ve method is illustrated on the left and the diagonal method
of Halevi and Shoup [20] is illustrated on the right. The entries in a single
color live in the same ciphertext. The key feature of the diagonal method is
that no two elements of the matrix that influence the same output element
appear with the same color.
the numbers are lined up in different slots; and (c) adding all
of them together.
Unfortunately, this results in unacceptable noise growth.
The underlying reason is that we need to perform two serial
SIMD scalar multiplications (resulting in an η2mult factor; see
Table IV). For most practical settings, this noise growth forces
us to use ciphertext moduli that are larger 64 bits, thus
overflowing the machine word. This necessitates the use of a
Double Chinese Remainder Theorem (DCRT) representation
similar to [15] which substantially slows down computation.
Instead we use an algorithmic approach to control noise
growth allowing the use of smaller moduli and avoiding the
need for DCRT.
C. Input Packing
Before moving on to more complex techniques we describe
an orthogonal approach to improve the naı¨ve method when
ni  n. The idea is to pack multiple copies of the input into
a single ciphertext. This allows us better utilization of the slots
by computing multiple outputs in parallel.
In detail we can (a) pack n/ni many different rows into
a single plaintext vector; (b) pack n/ni copies of the input
vector into a single ciphertext; and (c) perform the rest of the
naı¨ve method as-is except that the rotations are not applied
to the whole ciphertext but block-by-block (thus requiring
log(ni) many rotations). Roughly speaking, this achieves
communication and computation as if the number of rows
of the matrix were n′o = (no × ni)/n instead of no. When
ni  n, we have n′o  no.
D. The Diagonal Method
The diagonal method as described in the work of Halevi
and Shoup [20] (and implemented in [19]) provides another
potential solution to the problem of a large number of out-
put ciphertexts. The key high-level idea is to arrange the
matrix elements in such a way that after the SIMD scalar
multiplications, “interacting elements” of the matrix-vector
product never appear in a single ciphertext. Here, “interacting
elements” are the numbers that need to be added together to
obtain the final result. The rationale is that if this happens, we
never need to add two numbers that live in different slots of
the same ciphertexts, thus avoiding ciphertext rotation.
To do this, we encode the diagonal of the matrix into
a vector which is then SIMD scalar multiplied with the
input vector. The second diagonal (namely, the elements
W0,1,W1,2, . . . ,Wno−1,0) is encoded into another vector
which is then SIMD scalar multiplied with a rotation (by one)
of the input vector, and so on. Finally, all these vectors are
added together to obtain the output vector in one shot.
The cost of the diagonal method is:
• The total cost is ni SIMD scalar multiplications, ni − 1
rotations (automorphisms), and ni − 1 SIMD additions.
• The noise grows from η to (η + ηrot) · ηmult × ni which,
for the parameters we use, is larger than that of the naı¨ve
method, but much better than the naı¨ve method with
output packing. Roughly speaking, the reason is that in
the diagonal method, since rotations are performed before
scalar multiplication, the noise growth has a ηrot · ηmult
factor whereas in the naı¨ve method, the order is reversed
resulting in a ηmult + ηrot factor.
• Finally, this process produces a single ciphertext that has
the entire output vector in packed form already.
In our setting (and we believe in most reasonable settings),
the additional noise growth is an acceptable compromise given
the large gain in the output length and the corresponding gain
in the bandwidth and the overall run-time. Furthermore, the
fact that all rotations happen on the input ciphertexts prove
to be very important for an optimization of [21] we describe
below, called “hoisting”, which lets us amortize the cost of
many input rotations.
E. Book-keeping: Hoisting
The hoisting optimization reduces the cost of the ciphertext
rotation when the same ciphertext must be rotated by multiple
shift amounts. The idea, roughly speaking, is to “look inside”
the ciphertext rotation operation, and hoist out the part of the
computation that would be common to these rotations and then
compute it only once thus amortizing it over many rotations.
It turns out that this common computation involves computing
the NTT−1 (taking the ciphertext to the coefficient domain),
followed by a wrelin-bit decomposition that splits the ciphertext
d(log2 q)/wreline ciphertexts and finally takes these ciphertexts
back to the evaluation domain using separate applications of
NTT. The parameter wrelin is called the relinearization window
and represents a tradeoff between the speed and noise growth
of the Perm operation. This computation, which we denote
as PermDecomp, has Θ (n log n) complexity because of the
number theoretic transforms. In contrast, the independent
computation in each rotation, denoted by PermAuto, is a
simple Θ (n) multiply and accumulate operation. As such,
hoisting can provide substantial savings in contrast with direct
applications of the Perm operation and this is also borne out
by the benchmarks in Table VII.
F. A Hybrid Approach
One issue with the diagonal approach is that the number
of Perm is equal to ni. In the context of FC layers no is
often much lower than ni and hence it is desirable to have
a method where the Perm is close to no. Our hybrid scheme
achieves this by combining the best aspects of the naı¨ve and
diagonal schemes. We first extended the idea of diagonals for
a square matrix to squat rectangular weight matrices as shown
in Figure 6 and then pack the weights along these extended
diagonals into plaintext vectors. These plaintext vectors are
then multiplied with no rotations of the input ciphertext similar
to the diagonal method. Once this is done we are left with a
single ciphertext that contains n/no chunks each contains a
partial sum of the no outputs. We can proceed similar to the
naı¨ve method to accumulate these using a “rotate-and-sum”
algorithm.
We implement an input packed variant of the hybrid method
and the performance and noise growth characteristics (follow-
ing a straightforward derivation) are described in Table IV. We
note that hybrid method trades off hoistable input rotations in
the Diagonal method for output rotations on distinct cipher-
texts (which cannot be “hoisted out”). However, the decrease
in the number of input rotations is multiplicative while the
corresponding increase in the number of output rotations is the
logarithm of the same multiplicative factor. As such, the hybrid
method almost always outperforms the Naive and Diagonal
methods. We present detailed benchmarks over a selection of
matrix sizes in Table VIII.
We close this section with two implementation details. First,
recall that in order to enable faster NTT, our parameter
selection requires n to be a power of two. As a result the
permutation group we have access to is the group of half
rotations (Cn/2 × C2), i.e. the possible permutations are
compositions of rotations by up to n/2 for the two n/2-
sized segments, and swapping the two segments. The packing
and diagonal selection in the hybrid approach are modified
to account for this by adapting the definition of the extended
diagonal to be those entries of W that would be multiplied
by the corresponding entries of the ciphertext when the above
Perm operations are performed as shown in Figure 7. Finally,
as described in section III we control the noise growth in
Fig. 7. Four example extended digaonals after accounting for the rotation
group structure
SIMDScMult using plaintext windows for the weight matrix
W.
VI. FAST HOMOMORPHIC CONVOLUTIONS
We now move on the implementation of homomorphic
kernels for Conv layers. Analogous to the description of FC
layers we will start with simpler (and correspondingly less
efficient) techniques before moving on to our final optimized
implementation. In our setting, the server has access to a
plaintext filter and it is then provided encrypted input images,
which it must homomorphically convolve with its filter to
produce encrypted output images. As a running example for
this section we will consider a (fw, fh, ci, co)-Conv layer with
the “same” padding scheme, where the input is specified by
the tuple (wi, hi, ci). In order to better emphasize the key
ideas, we will split our presentation into two parts: first we
will describe the single input single output (SISO) case, i.e.
(ci = 1, co = 1) followed by the more general case where we
have multiple input and output channels, a subset of which
may fit within a single ciphertext.
A. Padded SISO
As seen in section II, same style convolutions require that
the input be zero-padded. As such, in this approach, we start
with a zero-padded version of the input with (fw−1)/2 zeros
on the left and right edges and (fh − 1)/2 zeros on the top
and bottom edges. We assume for now that this padded input
image is small enough to fit within a single ciphertext i.e.
(wi + fw − 1) · (hi + fh − 1) ≤ n and is mapped to the
ciphertext slots in a raster scan fashion. We then compute fw ·
fh rotations of the input and scale them by the corresponding
filter coefficient as shown in Figure 8. Since all the rotations
are performed on a common input image, they can benefit
from the hoisting optimization. Note that similar to the naı¨ve
matrix-vector product algorithm, the values on the periphery
of the output image leak partial products and must be obscured
by adding random values.
Fig. 8. Padded SISO Convolution
Fig. 9. Packed SISO Convolution. (Zeros in the punctured plaintext shown
in white.)
B. Packed SISO
While the above the technique computes the correct 2D-
convolution it ends up wasting (wi+ fw−1) · (hi+ fh−1)−
wi ·hi slots in zero padding. If either the input image is small
or if the filter size is large, this can amount to a significant
overhead. We resolve this issue by using the ability of our
PAHE scheme to multiply different slots with different scalars
when performing SIMDScMult. As a result, we can pack the
input tightly and generate fw · fh rotations. We then multiply
these rotated ciphertexts with punctured plaintexts which have
zeros in the appropriate locations as shown in Figure 9.
Accumulating these products gives us a single ciphertext that,
as a bonus feature, contains the convolution result without any
leakage of partial information.
Finally, we note that the construction of the punctured
plaintexts does not depend on either the encrypted image or the
client key information and as such, the server can precompute
these values once for multiple clients. We summarize these
results in Table III.
Now that we have seen how to compute a single 2D-
TABLE III
COMPARING SISO 2D-CONVOLUTIONS
Perm # slots
Padded fwfh − 1 (wi + fw − 1)(hi + fh − 1)
Packed fwfh − 1 wihi
convolution we will look at the more general multi-channel
case.
C. Single Channel per Ciphertext
The straightforward approach for handling the multi-channel
case is to encrypt the various channels into distinct ciphertexts.
We can then SISO convolve these ci-ciphertexts with each of
the co sets of filters to generate co output ciphertexts. Note that
although we need co · ci · fh · fw SIMDAdd and SIMDScMult
calls, just ci ·fh ·fw many Perm operations on the input suffice,
since the rotated inputs can be reused to generate each of the
co outputs. Furthermore, each these rotation can be hoisted
and hence we require just ci many PermDecomp calls and
ci · fh · fw many PermAuto calls.
D. Channel Packing
Similar to input-packed matrix-vector products, the compu-
tation of multi-channel convolutions can be further sped up by
packing multiple channels in a single ciphertext. We represent
the number of channels that fit in a single ciphertext by cn.
Channel packing allows us to perform cn-SISO convolutions
in parallel in a SIMD fashion. We maximize this parallelism
by using Packed SISO convolutions which enable us to tightly
pack the input channels without the need for any additional
padding.
For simplicity of presentation, we assume that both ci
and co are integral multiples of cn. Our high level goal is
to then start with ci/cn input ciphertexts and end up with
co/cn output ciphertexts where each of the input and output
ciphertexts contains cn distinct channels. We achieve this in
two steps: (a) convolve the input ciphertexts in a SISO fashion
to generate (co · ci)/cn intermediate ciphertexts that contain
all the co · ci-SISO convolutions and (b) accumulate these
intermediate ciphertexts into output ciphertexts.
Since none of the input ciphertexts repeat an input chan-
nel, none of the intermediate ciphertexts can contain SISO
convolutions corresponding to the same input channel. A
similar constraint on the output ciphertexts implies that none
of the intermediate ciphertexts contain SISO convolutions
corresponding to the same output. In particular, a potential
grouping of SISO convolutions that satisfies these constraints
is the diagonal grouping. More formally the kth intermediate
ciphertext in the diagonal grouping contains the following
ordered set of cn-SISO convolutions:
{ (bk/cic · cn + l,
b(k mod ci)/cnc · cn + ((k + l) mod cn)) | l ∈ [0, cn) }
where each tuple (xo, xi) represents the SISO convolution
corresponding to the output channel xo and input channel
xi. Given these intermediate ciphertexts, one can generate the
output ciphertexts by simply accumulating the co/cn-partitions
of ci consecutive ciphertexts. We illustrate this grouping and
accumulation when ci = co = 8 and cn = 4 in Figure 10.
Note that this grouping is very similar to the diagonal style of
computing matrix vector products, with single slots now being
replaced by entire SISO convolutions.
Fig. 10. Diagonal Grouping for Intermediate Ciphertexts (ci = co = 8 and
cn = 4)
Since the second step is just a simple accumulation of
ciphertexts, the major computational complexity of the convo-
lution arise in the computation of the intermediate ciphertexts.
If we partition the set of intermediate ciphertexts into cn-
sized rotation sets (shown in grey in Figure 10), we see that
each of the intermediate ciphertexts is generated by different
rotations of the same input. This observation leads to two
natural approaches to compute these intermediate ciphertexts.
Input Rotations: In the first approach, we generate cn
rotations of the every input ciphertext and then perform Packed
SISO convolutions on each of these rotations to compute
all the intermediate rotations required by co/cn rotation sets.
Since each of the SISO convolutions requires fw ·fh rotations,
we require a total of (cn · fw · fh− 1) rotations (excluding the
trivial rotation by zero) for each of the ci/cn inputs. Finally
we remark that by using the hoisting optimization we compute
all these rotations by performing just ci/cn PermDecomp
operations.
Output Rotations: The second approach is based on the
realization that instead of generating (cn · fw · fh − 1) input
rotations, we can reuse (fw ·fh−1) rotations in each rotation-
set to generate cn convolutions and then simply rotate (cn −
1) of these to generate all the intermediate ciphertexts. This
approach then reduces the number of input rotations by factor
of cn while requiring (cn − 1) for each of the (ci · co)/c2n
rotation sets. Note that while (fw · fh− 1) input rotations per
input ciphertext can share a common PermDecomp each of
the output rotations occur on a distinct ciphertext and cannot
benefit from hoisting.
We summarize these numbers in Table IV. The choice
between the input and output rotation variants is an interesting
trade-off that is governed by the size of the 2D filter. This
trade-off is illustrated in more detail with concrete benchmarks
in section VII. Finally, we remark that similar to the matrix-
vector product computation, the convolution algorithms are
also tweaked to work with the half-rotation permutation group
and use plaintext windows to control the scalar multiplication
noise growth.
Fig. 11. Decomposing a strided convolutions into simple convolutions (fw =
fh = 3 and sx = sy = 2)
Strided Convolutions: We handle strided convolutions by
decomposing the strided convolution into a sum of simple
convolutions each of which can be handled as above. We
illustrate this case for fw = fh = 3 and sx = sy = 2 in
Figure 11.
Low-noise Batched Convolutions: We make one final re-
mark on a potential application for padded SISO convolutions.
Padded SISO convolutions are computed as a sum of rotated
versions of the input images multiplied by corresponding
constants fx,y . The coefficient domain representation of these
plaintext vectors is (fx,y, 0, . . . , 0). As a result, the noise
growth factor is ηmult = fx,y ·
√
n as opposed to p · √n,
consequently noise growth depends only on the value of the
filter coefficients and not on the size of the plaintext space p.
The direct use of this technique precludes the use of channel
packing since the filter coefficients are channel dependent. One
potential application that can mitigate this issue is when we
want to classify a batch of multiple images. In this context,
we can pack the same channel from multiple classifications
allowing us to use a simple constant filter. This allows us
to trade-off classification latency for higher throughput. Note
however that similar to padded SISO convolutions, this has
two problems: (a) it results in lower slot utilization compare
to packed approaches, and (b) the padding scheme reveals the
size of the filter.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION AND MICRO-BENCHMARKS
Next we describe the implementation of the GAZELLE
framework starting with the chosen cryptographic primitives
(VII-A). We then describe our evaluation test-bed (VII-B) and
finally conclude this section with detailed micro-benchmarks
(VII-C) for all the operations to highlight the individual con-
tributions of the techniques described in the previous sections.
A. Cryptographic Primitives
GAZELLE needs two main cryptographic primitives for
neural network inference: a packed additive homomorphic en-
cryption (PAHE) scheme and a two-party secure computation
(2PC) scheme. Parameters for both schemes are selected for
a 128-bit security level. For the PAHE scheme we instantiate
the Brakerski-Fan-Vercauteren (BFV) scheme [6], [13], which
requires selection of the following parameters: ciphertext mod-
ulus (q), plaintext modulus (p), the number of SIMD slots (n)
and the error parameter (σ). Maximizing the q/p ratio allows
us to tolerate more noise, thus allowing for more computation.
A plaintext modulus p of 20 bits is enough to store all the
TABLE IV
COMPARING MULTI-CHANNEL 2D-CONVOLUTIONS
PermDecomp Perm #in ct #out ct
One Channel per CT ci (fwfh − 1) · ci ci co
Input Rotations ci
cn
(cnfwfh − 1) · cicn
ci
cn
co
cn
Output Rotations
(
1 +
(cn−1)·co
cn
)
ci
cn
(
fwfh − 1 + (cn−1)·cocn
)
ci
cn
ci
cn
co
cn
intermediate values in the network computation . This choice
of the plaintext modulus size also allows for Barrett reduction
on a 64-bit machine. The ciphertext modulus (q) is chosen
to be a 60-bit psuedo-Mersenne prime that is slightly smaller
than the native machine word on a 64-bit machine to enable
lazy modular reductions.
The selection of the number of slots is a more subtle trade-
off between security and performance. In order to allow an
efficient implementation of the number-theoretic transform
(NTT), the number of slots (n) must be a power of two. The
amortized per-slot computational cost of both the SIMDAdd
and SIMDScMult operations is O(1), however the correspond-
ing cost for the Perm operation is O(log n). This means that
as n increases, the computation becomes less efficient while
on the other hand for a given q, a larger n results in a higher
security level. Hence we pick the smallest power of two that
allows for a 128-bit security which in our case is n = 2048.
For the 2PC framework, we use Yao’s Garbled circuits [40].
The main reason for choosing Yao over Boolean secret
sharing schemes (such as the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson
protocol [17] and its derivatives) is that the constant number
of rounds results in good performance over long latency links.
Our garbling scheme is an extension of the one presented
in JustGarble [3] which we modify to also incorporate the
Half-Gates optimization [41]. We base our oblivious trans-
fer (OT) implementation on the classic Ishai-Kilian-Nissim-
Petrank (IKNP) [24] protocol from libOTe [30]. Since we
use 2PC for implementing the ReLU, MaxPool and FHE-
2PC transformation gadget, our circuit garbling phase only
depends on the neural network topology and is independent
of the client input. As such, we move it to the offline phase of
the computation while the OT Extension and circuit evaluation
is run during the online phase of the computation.
B. Evaluation Setup
All benchmarks were generated using c4.xlarge AWS in-
stances which provide a 4-threaded execution environment (on
an Intel Xeon E5-2666 v3 2.90GHz CPU) with 7.5GB of sys-
tem memory. Our experiments were conducted using Ubuntu
16.04.2 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.4.0-1041-aws) and our library was
compiled using GCC 5.4.0 using the ’-O3’ optimization setting
and enabling support for the AES-NI instruction set. Our
schemes are evaluated in the LAN setting similar to previous
work with both instances in the us-east-1a availability zone.
TABLE V
FAST REDUCTION FOR NTT AND INV. NTT
Operation Fast Reduction Naive Reduction Speedup
t (µs) cyc/bfly t (µs) cyc/bfly
NTT (q) 57 7.34 393 50.59 6.9
Inv. NTT (q) 54 6.95 388 49.95 7.2
NTT (p) 43 5.54 240 30.89 5.6
Inv. NTT (p) 38 4.89 194 24.97 5.1
TABLE VI
FHE MICROBENCHMARKS
Operation Fast Reduction Naive Reduction Speedup
t (µs) cyc/slot t (µs) cyc/slot
KeyGen 232 328.5 952 1348.1 4.1
Encrypt 186 263.4 621 879.4 3.3
Decrypt 125 177.0 513 726.4 4.1
SIMDAdd 5 8.1 393 49.7 6.1
SIMDScMult 10 14.7 388 167.1 11.3
PermKeyGen 466 659.9 1814 2568.7 3.9
Perm 268 379.5 1740 2463.9 6.5
PermDecomp 231 327.1 1595 2258.5 6.9
PermAuto 35 49.6 141 199.7 4.0
C. Micro-benchmarks
In order to isolate the impact of the various techniques and
identify potential optimization opportunities, we first present
micro-benchmarks for the individual operations.
1) Arithmetic and PAHE Benchmarks: We first benchmark
the impact of the faster modular arithmetic on the NTT and
the homomorphic evaluation run-times. Table V shows that
the use of a pseudo-Mersenne ciphertext modulus coupled
with lazy modular reduction improves the NTT and inverse
NTT by roughly 7×. Similarly Barrett reduction for the
plaintext modulus improves the plaintext NTT runtimes by
more than 5×. These run-time improvements are also reflected
in the performance of the primitive homomorphic operations
as shown in Table VI.
Table VII demonstrates the noise performance trade-off
inherent in the permutation operation. Note that an individual
permutation after the initial decomposition is roughly 8-9×
faster than a permutation without any pre-computation. Finally
we observe a linear growth in the run-time of the permutation
operation with an increase in the number of windows, allowing
us to trade off noise performance for run-time if few future
TABLE VII
PERMUTATION MICROBENCHMARKS
# windows PermKeyGen Key Size PermAuto Noise
t (µs) kB t (µs) bits
3 466 49.15 35 29.3
6 925 98.30 57 19.3
12 1849 196.61 100 14.8
operations are desired on the permuted ciphertext.
2) Linear Algebra Benchmarks: Next we present micro-
benchmarks for the linear algebra kernels. In particular we
focus on matrix-vector products and 2D convolutions since
these are the operations most frequently used in neural net-
work inference. Before performing these operations, the server
must perform a one-time client-independent setup that pre-
processes the matrix and filter coefficients. In contrast with
the offline phase of 2PC, this computation is NOT repeated
per classification or per client and can be performed without
any knowledge of the client keys. In the following results, we
represent the time spent in this amortizable setup operation as
tsetup. Note that toffline for both these protocols is zero.
The matrix-vector product that we are interested in corre-
sponds to the multiplication of a plaintext matrix with a packed
ciphertext vector. We first start with a comparison of three
matrix-vector multiplication techniques:
1) Naive: Every slot of the output is generated indepen-
dently by computing an inner-product of a row of the
matrix with ciphertext column vector.
2) Diagonal: Rotations of the input are multiplied by the
generalized diagonals from the plaintext matrix and
added to generate a packed output.
3) Hybrid: Use the diagonal approach to generate a single
output ciphertext with copies of the output partial sums.
Use the naive approach to generate the final output from
this single ciphertext
We compare these techniques for the following matrix sizes:
2048 × 1, 1024 × 128, 128 × 16. For all these methods we
report the online computation time and the time required
to setup the scheme in milliseconds. Note that this setup
needs to be done exactly once per network and need not be
repeated per inference. The naive scheme uses a 20bit plaintext
window (wpt) while the diagonal and hybrid schemes use
10bit plaintext windows. All schemes use a 7bit relinearization
window (wrelin).
As seen in Section V the online time for the matrix
multiplication operation can be improved further by a judicious
selection of the window sizes based on the size of the matrix
used. Table IX shows the potential speed up possible from
optimal window sizing. Note that although this optimal choice
reduces the online run-time, the relinearization keys for all the
window sizes must be sent to the server in the initial setup
phase.
Finally we remark that our matrix multiplication scheme
is extremely parsimonious in the online bandwidth. The two-
TABLE VIII
MATRIX MULTIPLICATION MICROBENCHMARKS
#in rot #out rot #mac tonline tsetup
2048×1
N 0 11 1 7.9 16.1
D 2047 0 2048 383.3 3326.8
H 0 11 1 8.0 16.2
1024×128
N 0 1280 128 880.0 1849.2
D 1023 1024 2048 192.4 1662.8
H 63 4 64 16.2 108.5
1024×16
N 0 160 16 110.3 231.4
D 1023 1024 2048 192.4 1662.8
H 7 7 8 7.8 21.8
128×16
N 0 112 16 77.4 162.5
D 127 128 2048 25.4 206.8
H 0 7 1 5.3 10.5
TABLE IX
HYBRID MATRIX MULTIPLICATION WINDOW SIZING
wpt wrelin tonline Speedup tsetup Speedup
2048×1 20 20 3.6 2.2 5.7 2.9
1024×128 10 9 14.2 1.1 87.2 1.2
1024×16 10 7 7.8 1.0 21.5 1.0
128×16 20 20 2.5 2.1 3.7 2.8
way online message sizes for all the matrices are given by
(w+ 1) ∗ ctsz where ctsz is the size of a single ciphertext (32
kB for our parameters).
Next we compare the two techniques we presented for
2D convolution: input rotation (I) and output rotation (O) in
Table X. We present results for four convolution sizes with
increasing complexity. Note that the 5×5 convolution is strided
convolution with a stride of 2. All results are presented with
a 10bit wpt and a 8bit wrelin.
As seen from Table X, the output rotation variant is usually
the faster variant since it reuses the same input multiple times.
Larger filter sizes allow us to save more rotations and hence
experience a higher speed-up, while for the 1×1 case the input
rotation variant is faster. Finally, we note that in all cases we
TABLE X
CONVOLUTION MICROBENCHMARKS
Input Filter Algorithm tonline tsetup
(W×H, C) (W×H, C) (ms) (ms)
(28× 28, 1) (5× 5, 5) I 14.4 11.7O 9.2 11.4
(16× 16, 128) (1× 1, 128) I 107 334O 110 226
(32× 32, 32) (3× 3, 32) I 208 704O 195 704
(16× 16, 128) (3× 3, 128) I 767 3202O 704 3312
TABLE XI
ACTIVATION AND POOLING MICROBENCHMARKS
Algorithm Outputs toffline tonline BWoffline BWonline(ms) (ms) (MB) (MB)
Square 2048 0.5 1.4 0 0.093
ReLU 1000 89 201 5.43 1.6810000 551 1307 54.3 16.8
MaxPool 1000 164 426 15.6 8.3910000 1413 3669 156.0 83.9
pack both the input and output activations using the minimal
number of ciphertexts.
3) Square, ReLU and MaxPool Benchmarks: We round our
discussion of the operation micro-benchmarks with the various
activation functions we consider. In the networks of interest,
we come across two major activation functions: Square and
ReLU. Additionally we also benchmark the MaxPool layer
with (2× 2)-sized windows.
For square pooling, we implement a simple interactive pro-
tocol using our additively homomorphic encryption scheme.
For ReLU and MaxPool, we implement a garbled circuit based
interactive protocol. The results for both are presented in
Table XI.
VIII. NETWORK BENCHMARKS AND COMPARISON
Next we compose the individual layers from the previ-
ous sections and evaluate complete networks. For ease of
comparison with previous approaches, we report runtimes
and network bandwidth for MNIST and CIFAR-10 image
classification tasks. We segment our comparison based on
the CNN topology. This allows us to clearly demonstrate the
speedup achieved by GAZELLE as opposed to gains through
network redesign.
A. The MNIST Dataset.
MNIST is a basic image classification task where we are
provided with a set of 28×28 grayscale images of handwritten
digits in the range [0−9]. Given an input image our goal is to
predict the correct handwritten digit it represents. We evaluate
this task using four published network topologies which use a
combination of FC and Conv layers:
1) A: 3-FC layers with square activation from [27].
2) B: 1-Conv and 2-FC layers with square activation from
[16].
3) C: 1-Conv and 2-FC layers with ReLU activation from
[33].
4) D: 2-Conv and 2-FC layers with ReLU and MaxPool
from [26].
Runtime and the communication required for classifying a
single image for these four networks are presented in table
XII.
For all four networks we use a 10bit wpt and a 9bit wrelin.
Networks A and B use only the square activation function
allowing us to use a much simpler AHE base interactive
protocol, thus avoiding any use of GC’s. As such we only need
TABLE XII
MNIST BENCHMARK
Framework Runtime (s) Communication (MB)
Offline Online Total Offline Online Total
A
SecureML 4.7 0.18 4.88 - - -
MiniONN 0.9 0.14 1.04 3.8 12 47.6
GAZELLE 0 0.03 0.03 0 0.5 0.5
B
CryptoNets - - 297.5 - - 372.2
MiniONN 0.88 0.4 1.28 3.6 44 15.8
GAZELLE 0 0.03 0.03 0 0.5 0.5
C
DeepSecure - - 9.67 - - 791
Chameleon 1.34 1.36 2.7 7.8 5.1 12.9
GAZELLE 0.15 0.05 0.20 5.9 2.1 8.0
D
MiniONN 3.58 5.74 9.32 20.9 636.6 657.5
ExPC - - 5.1 - - 501
GAZELLE 0.481 0.33 0.81 47.5 22.5 70.0
TABLE XIII
CIFAR-10 BENCHMARK
Framework Runtime (s) Communication (MB)
Offline Online Total Offline Online Total
A MiniONN 472 72 544 3046 6226 9272
GAZELLE 9.34 3.56 12.9 940 296 1236
to transmit short ciphertexts in the online phase. Similarly our
use of the AHE based FC and Conv layers as opposed to
multiplications triples results in 5-6× lower latency compared
to [26] and [27] for network A. The comparison with [16] is
even more the stark. The use of AHE with interaction acting as
an implicit bootstraping stage allows for aggressive parameter
selection for the lattice based scheme. This results in over
3 orders of magnitude savings in both the latency and the
network bandwidth.
Networks C and D use ReLU and MaxPool functions which
we implement using GC. However even for these the network
our efficient FC and Conv implementation allows us roughly
30× and 17× lower runtime when compared with [29] and
[26] respectively. Furthermore we note that unlike [29] our
solution does not rely on a trusted third party.
B. The CIFAR-10 Dataset.
The CIFAR-10 task is a second commonly used image
classification benchmark that is substantially more compli-
cated than the MNIST classification task. The task consists of
classifying 32×32 color with 3 color channels into 10 classes
such as automobiles, birds, cats, etc. For this task we replicate
the network topology from [26] to offer a fair comparison. We
use a 10bit wpt and a 8bit wrelin.
We note that the complexity of this network when measure
by the number of multiplications is 500× that used in the
MNIST network from [33], [29]. By avoiding the need for
multiplication triples GAZELLE offers a 50× faster offline
phase and a 20× lower latency per inference showing that
our results from the smaller MNIST networks scale to larger
networks.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In conclusion, this work presents GAZELLE, a low-latency
framework for secure neural network inference. GAZELLE uses
a judicious combination of packed additively homomorphic
encryption and garbled circuit based two-party computation
to obtain 20 − 30× lower latency and 2.5 − 88× lower
online bandwidth when compared with multiple two-party
computation based state-of-art secure network inference so-
lutions [26], [27], [29], [33], and more than 3 orders of
magnitude lower latency and 2 orders of magnitude lower
bandwidth than purely homomorphic approaches [16]. We
briefly recap the key contributions of our work that enable
this improved performance:
1) Selection of prime moduli that simultaneously allow
single instruction multiple data (SIMD) operations, low
noise growth and division-free and lazy modular reduc-
tion.
2) Avoidance of ciphertext-ciphertext multiplications to re-
duce noise growth.
3) Use of secret-sharing and interaction to emulate a
lightweight bootstrapping procedure allowing for the
composition of multiple layers to evaluate deep net-
works.
4) Homomorphic linear algebra kernels that make efficient
use of the automorphism structure enabled by a power-
of-two slot-size.
5) Sparing use of garbled circuits limited to ReLU and
MaxPooling non-linearities that require linear-sized
Boolean circuits.
6) A compact garbled circuit-based transformation gadget
that allows to securely compose the PAHE-based and
garbled circuit based layers.
We envision the following avenues to extend our work on
GAZELLE and make it more broadly applicable. A natural next
step is to handle larger application-specific neural networks
that work with substantially larger inputs to tackle data analyt-
ics problems in the medical and financial domains. In ongoing
work, we extend our techniques to a large variety of classic
two-party tasks such as privacy-preserving face recognition
[34] which can be factored into linear and non-linear phases
of computation similar to what is done in this work. In
the low-latency LAN setting, it would also be interesting to
evaluate the impact of switching out the garbled-circuit based
approach for a GMW-based approach which would allow us
to trade off latency to substantially reduce the online and
offline bandwdith. A final, very interesting and ambitious line
of work would be to build a compiler that allows us to easily
express arbitrary computations and automatically factor the
computation into PAHE and two-party primitives.
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